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THE WILLFULNESS PENDULUM SWINGS BACK:
HOW SEAGATE HELPS LEVEL
THE PLAYING FIELD
I. INTRODUCTION
You just learned that one of your company's biggest competitors has
been manufacturing its products using your company's patented
technology. Accordingly, your company initiates a lawsuit to recover lost
profits and to protect its intellectual property. After lengthy litigation, the
court finds in your company's favor and awards compensatory damages of
$19.6 million along with attorneys' fees.' In addition, the court holds that
your competitor "willfully infringed" your company's patent which
doubles the damages to $39.2 million.2 However, soon after, the judge
overturns the earlier award of double damages and attorneys' fees because
the standard for determining willful infringement has just changed.3 The
penalty associated with willfully infringing your patent has potentially
decreased under the new standard, and that is a step in the right direction
for the patent system.
On August 20, 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
issued a ruling that substantially altered its willful patent infringement
jurisprudence.4 The In re Seagate Technology, LLC decision overruled a
twenty-four-year-old precedent and established a two-part "objective
recklessness" test for proving willful infringement.5 In doing so, Seagate
elevated the previously lower threshold for proving willfulness established
by Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.6 This heightened
1. See Press Release, Broadcom, Federal Judge Affirms Jury Verdict that Qualcomm
Infringes Three Broadcom Patents (Nov. 23, 2007),
http://www.broadcom.com/press/release.php?id=1080667 (noting the jury found Qualcomm had
willfully infringed upon Broadcom's patented cell phone technology).
2. See id. (finding Broadcom's patents had been "willfully infringed," the district court
judge awarded Broadcom double the damage amount set by the jury).
3. See id.
4. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
5. Id. at 1371.
6. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
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standard has made it more difficult for a party to recover enhanced
damages, also known as treble damages, which allowed for an award up to
three times the original damages amount.7
The Federal Circuit's willful patent infringement jurisprudence has
consistently tried to balance the rights of patent holders, the rights of
alleged patent infringers, and the goals of the patent system. 8 The tension
between these competing interests helps explain why the court's
"willfulness" jurisprudence is in a constant state of flux. In fact, Seagate is
further evidence of the Federal Circuit's continuing goal to protect the
fundamental liberties of alleged willful infringers, 9 as well as the need to
protect parties from having to pay unreasonable damages.
Although the Federal Circuit's willfulness framework is a step in the
right direction for protecting the rights of potential patent infringers, the
question still remains whether this policy change unfairly burdens
legitimate patent holders. Moreover, the Federal Circuit's refusal to fully
articulate the bounds of the test leaves many questions unanswered. 10 For
example, although the Federal Circuit provided some guidance on objective
recklessness, it failed to fully explain how lower courts should apply the
new standard. " The Seagate opinion instead leaves application of the test
to future cases. " As a result, lower courts have the monumental task of
determining how objective recklessness can be proved or disproved. 13
Technicalities aside, the overall design of the Seagate test makes it more
difficult for patent holders to collect treble damages. 14
7. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (providing that "the court may increase the damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed.").
8. FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 2 (2003), available at
http://www.fic.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC STUDY] ("Competition and
patents are not inherently in conflict.... Patent law plays an important role in the property rights
regime essential to a well-functioning competitive economy.").
9. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (protecting alleged willful infringers from adverse inference for not having
obtained advice of counsel, and limiting the scope of waiver of attorney-client privilege and/or
work-product privilege when asserting the advice of counsel defense).
10. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 ("We leave it to future cases to further develop the




14. See id. (making it more difficult to collect treble damages by increasing the burden of
proof from an affirmative duty of care towards the patent holder's patents to requiring proof of
objective recklessness and eliminating the alleged infringer's affirmative duty to seek legal
advice).
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This Note discusses some of the implications of the Seagate test.
More specifically, this Note discusses how Seagate is likely to affect
alleged patent infringers. Will Seagate unfairly burden legitimate patent
holders? Does the decision help further any of the goals of the patent
system? This Note explores some of the results produced by the previous
willfulness test, as established by Underwater Devices, 15 and compares
them to the results the new Seagate test is likely to produce.
In doing so, this Note contends that although Seagate is a severe
restriction on a patent holder's ability to collect treble damages, it is
nonetheless a step in the right direction toward resolving the inequities that
resulted from the court's prior willfulness jurisprudence. Although trebling
damages is an important mechanism that provides a punitive measure, the
use of enhanced damages should be restricted only to reprehensible
conduct. In addition to Seagate's willfulness analysis, this Note also
explores the manner in which Seagate limits the scope of the waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product protection when an
alleged infringer defends a willful infringement charge. Both Seagate's
new willfulness test and its limits on the scope of waiver are necessary in
order to remedy the inequities that resulted from the court's previous
willfulness jurisprudence.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Origin of Enhanced Damages and Willful Infringement
The basis for enhanced damages, also known as treble damages, is
provided in section 284 of the Patent Act. 16 Section 284 states that "a court
may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed,"
in addition to an award that adequately compensates for the infringement. 17
In effect, the statute gives courts discretion to award enhanced damages. In
practice, willful infringement is a question left for the jury. i8 Once a jury
decides the infringement was willful, the judge then determines whether the
damages should be increased. 19
15. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389 ("Where... a potential infringer has actual
notice of another's patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine
whether or not he is infringing.").
16. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
17. Id.
18. See STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 118
(2004).
19. See id. ("In practice the threshold question, usually submitted to a jury, is whether the
defendant has been 'willful' in the infringement. If the jury finds willfulness, then the judge will
2008]
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Section 284 does not enumerate situations where enhanced damages
would be appropriate. 20  A literal interpretation of the statute would
essentially give judges discretion to award enhanced damages in any
situation they see fit. 21 However, courts have not adhered to such a strict
interpretation. 22 Consistent with Supreme Court precedent,23 the Federal
Circuit held that willful infringement was required before a party could
24collect enhanced damages. In Seymour v. McCormick, the Supreme
Court gave the rationale for this limitation, declaring that a "rule equally
affecting all cases, without regard to their peculiar merits"' 25 made a
defendant acting in ignorance or good faith as culpable as a "wanton and
malicious pirate. ' 26 Such a result, the Court held, would be "manifestly
unjust. ' 27  Accordingly, it restricted when enhanced damages were
available. 28 However, even in its limited form, the willful infringement
doctrine still provided courts with a powerful mechanism for maintaining
and preserving patent rights.29  Indeed, one of the original motivations
behind the willful infringement doctrine was to address the widespread
disrespect for patent rights and patent validity. 3
0
Despite these limitations, patent holders welcomed the willful
infringement doctrine. 3 ' In fact, the slim possibility of receiving treble
damages has led patent holders to allege a separate charge for willful
infringement in almost all patent infringement cases.32 The chance to win
treble damages is just one motivating factor. A greater incentive to allege
willfulness stems from its sheer coercive power. For example, an alleged
infringer is much more likely to settle than challenge a willfulness charge,
even one that only has a remote possibility of succeeding.33 In order to
determine whether and how much to increase damages.
20. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
23. See, e.g., Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1853) (refusing to establish a
horizontal rule for awarding treble damages in infringement cases without regard for the merits).
24. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d
1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
25. Seymour, 57 U.S. at 488.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 488-89.
29. See Carol Johns, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.: A
Step in the Right Direction for Willful Infringement, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 69, 72 (2005).
30. See id. at 72-73.
31. See Ira V. Heffan, Willful Patent Infringement, 7 FED. CIR. B.J. 115, 139-40 (1997).
32. Id. at 139.
33. Jon E. Wright, Comment, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages-
Evolution and Analysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 97, 97 (2001).
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curtail such abuse and ensure fairness, courts have refined the willful
infringement doctrine considerably over the years.34 The refining process
has not been easy, and courts have had a difficult time balancing the rights
of patent holders against the rights of those accused of willful
infringement.
B. Evolution of the Willful Infringement Doctrine
In Seymour v. McCormick, the Supreme Court began laying the
foundation for the willful infringement doctrine and the use of enhanced
damages under the Patent Act of 1836.36 McCormick, the patent holder,
brought suit against Seymour for infringement of McCormick's patent on a
grain-harvesting machine. 37 The jury returned a damages award that was
nearly twice the amount demanded by the plaintiff. 38 The Court, however,
noted that "the Patent Act of 1836 confines the jury to the assessment of
'actual damages"' and that "[t]he power to inflict vindictive or punitive
damages is [at] the discretion and judgment of the court. .... 39The Court
distinguished an infringer who acts in "ignorance or good faith" from one
who acted like a "wanton or malicious pirate.",40 As a result, courts have
consistently applied the enhanced damages provision to punish only those
who intentionally infringe another's patent or act in bad faith. 4 ' In fact,
courts have generally limited enhanced damages to situations where a party
42"deliberately, consciously, and willfully" infringed another's patent.
1. Willful Infringement and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
The creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982
marked a new era for the willful infringement doctrine.43  The Federal
Circuit was created under the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (the
Act) "by the merger of two Article III courts-the Court of Claims and the
34. See Johns, supra note 29, at 73-75.
35. See id. at 83-86 (explaining the criticisms and problems with the willful infringement
doctrine that have developed over the years).
36. See generally Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480 (1853).
37. Id. at 485.
38. Id. at 491.
39. Id. at 489.
40. Id. at 488.
41. See Johns, supra note 29, at 73 ("In the wake of Seymour, courts generally imposed
enhanced damages only where there was evidence of deliberate copying or other bad faith
behavior.").
42. Wright, supra note 33, at 104.
43. Id.
20081
244 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WREVIEW [Vol. 28:239
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals." 44 The Act gave the Federal Circuit
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent matters with the idea that a
specialized court would lead to a stable patent system that fostered growth
and innovation.45
Over the years, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
considerably refined the willful infringement doctrine.46 As early as 1983,
the Federal Circuit developed an initial framework for awarding enhanced
damages in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co. 47 In
Underwater Devices, the Federal Circuit held that where "a potential
infringer has actual notice of another's patent rights, he has an affirmative
duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing."
' 48
The court further articulated that this "affirmative duty includes, inter alia,
the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the
initiation of any possible infringing activity." 49 In addition, the Federal
Circuit opined that a finding of willful infringement would be based on the
"totality of the circumstances presented." 5
0
Two subsequent cases developed a series of factors that would help
courts determine whether to award enhanced damages. In Bott v. Four Star
Corp., 51 the Federal Circuit held that, in determining willfulness:
[T]he court will consider the totality of the circumstances,
including (1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas
or design of another; (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of
the other's patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent
and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was
not infringed[;] and (3) the infringer's behavior as a party to the
litigation. 52
Realizing the limited nature of the factors promulgated in Bott, the
Federal Circuit adopted six additional factors in Read Corp. v. Portec,
Inc.,53 which expanded the "totality of the circumstances" inquiry so courts
could take additional pertinent facts into account when determining
whether enhanced damages should be awarded. 54  The Read factors
44. Id. at 105.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 97-98.
47. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
48. Id. at 1389.
49. Id. at 1390.
50. Id.
51. Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
52. Id. at 1572 (internal citations omitted).
53. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
54. See id. at 827.
THE WILLFULNESS PENDULUM SWINGS BACK
include: (1) consideration for the defendant's size and financial condition;
(2) the closeness of the case, indicating that enhanced damages would not
be appropriate for close cases; (3) duration of the defendant's misconduct;
(4) leniency for "remedial action by the defendant"; (5) the defendant's
motivation for infringing; and (6) whether the defendant attempted to
conceal the misconduct.55 Taken together, the Bott and Read factors form
a general framework for a trier of fact to determine, based on the totality of
the circumstances, whether a party has infringed a patent and whether
enhanced damages should be awarded.
2. Opinion of Counsel and the Adverse Inference Doctrine
The Underwater Devices decision left many questions unanswered.
For example, what types of conduct are presumptively willful? How can
defendants rebut allegations of willful infringement? More specifically,
was obtaining competent legal advice a prerequisite for potential patent
infringers?
To satisfy the Underwater Devices duty of due care standard, it was
common for alleged willful infringers to obtain a favorable opinion from
their counsel before beginning the infringing activity at issue. 16 Under an
"advice of counsel" defense, an alleged willful infringer "aims to establish
that due to reasonable reliance on advice from counsel, its continued
accused activities were done in good faith." 57 For instance, counsel may
have advised the accused that the patent at issue was "invalid,
unenforceable, and/or not infringed." 58 The need for an opinion was even
greater if the infringer had knowledge of its competitor's product. 59 The
advice of counsel defense underwent significant changes over the years,
beginning with Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 60 then Fromson v.
Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 6' and finally with the Federal Circuit's
landmark ruling in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 829-30.
57. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
58. Id.
59. Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Labs., 677 F.2d 1202, 1211 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[O]nce the
interference proceeding had been concluded and the patent had been issued to Novo, Travenol
was under an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether it had a reasonable legal
basis for its continued sale of Fromase .. "); Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc.,
461 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that the Goldstein's failure to obtain an opinion of
counsel after the patent was issued "alone is enough to support a conclusion of willfulness").
60. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
61. Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
2008]
246 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:239
Dana Corp. 
62
In Kloster, the Federal Circuit explicitly stated that, if on notice of a
pre-existing patent, an alleged infringer's failure to assert the advice of
counsel defense "would warrant the conclusion that it either obtained no
advice of counsel or did so and was advised" that their patent would
infringe.63 By stressing the importance of the advice of counsel defense,
and incentivizing potential infringers to exercise due care, the Kloster
decision reflected the Federal Circuit's drive to ensure that the patent
system protected a patentee's rights. Additionally, in Fromson, the Federal
Circuit held that "[w]here the infringer fails to introduce an exculpatory
opinion of counsel at trial, a court must be free to infer that either no
opinion was obtained or, if an opinion were obtained, it was contrary to the
infringer's desire to initiate or continue its use of the patentee's
invention." 64
The Kloster line of cases gave parties a strong incentive to consult a
competent attorney before potential infringement.65 However, two serious
flaws arose as a result of these cases. First, the presumptive guilt assigned
to alleged infringers for failing to obtain advice from counsel was an unjust
burden.66 Under Kloster and Fromson, there was a significant risk that a
court might prejudge an alleged infringer solely for failing to seek legal
advice. 67 Second, questions arose over whether alleged infringers could
assert the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection in order to
avoid having to produce an opinion of counsel.68
In the landmark Knorr-Bremse decision, the Federal Circuit
recognized the importance of protecting fundamental client privileges.69 In
doing so, the court overruled nearly twenty years of Federal Circuit
precedent. 70 In Knorr-Bremse, the Federal Circuit asked if it was
"appropriate for the trier of fact to draw an adverse inference with respect
to willful infringement" when a defendant invokes the attorney-client
62. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
63. Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1580.
64. Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1572-73; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[F]ailure to introduce an exculpatory opinion
of counsel at trial may support an inference that such an opinion was either never obtained or was
adverse.").
65. See generally Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1565.
66. Id. at 1579.
67. See id.; see also Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1572-73.
68. Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1580.
69. Knorr-Bremse Systeme, 383 F.3d at 1344.
70. See id. at 1347.
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privilege or work-product protection.7' In addition, the Federal Circuit
also considered whether it was appropriate to draw an adverse inference
with respect to willful infringement in cases where alleged infringers did
not seek legal advice. 72
Signaling a change in the usual emphasis on securing patentee's
rights, the Federal Circuit surprisingly ruled in favor of accused willful
infringers by answering both of these questions with a categorical "no." 
73
No longer would a trier of fact be allowed to infer guilt based solely on an
alleged infringer's assertion of the attorney-client or work-product
privileges. The adverse inference prohibition even protected alleged
infringers who failed to obtain legal advice. 75 The Knorr-Bremse decision
made willful infringement "more difficult to prove, and thus treble
damages and attorneys' fees, more difficult to obtain."76 This was a severe
blow to patentee's rights.
Because it was improper after Knorr-Bremse to infer willful
infringement based on an alleged infringer's failure to seek advice of
counsel, potential infringers had less incentive to do so. 77 However, some
incentive remained because the Federal Circuit gave some weight to legal
opinions used as exculpatory evidence. 78  Thus, even though some
considered Knorr-Bremse a triumph for alleged infringers, it nevertheless
added another layer of complexity to willfulness jurisprudence.79
Accordingly, accused infringers soon discovered that there were
consequences for using the advice of counsel defense to rebut a willfulness
charge. 80
71. Id. at 1344.
72. Id. at 1345.
73. See id. at 1344-45.
74. Id. at 1344.
75. Knorr-Bremse Systeme, 383 F.3d at 1345.
76. Sue Ann Mota, Knorr-Bremse v. Dana Corporation-Willful Patent Infringement May
No Longer Be Inferred Either From the Failure to Seek Legal Advice or Invoking the Attorney-
Client Privilege, According to the Federal Circuit, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 901, 901 (2005).
77. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme, 383 F.3d at 1345-46.
78. See generally id.
79. See Johns, supra note 29, at 70.
80. See, e.g., In re Echostar Conumc'ns. Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1298-99 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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3. Waiver of the Attomey-Client Privilege and Work-Product Protection
Although courts were no longer able to make an adverse inference
after Knorr-Bremse, accused willful infringers still faced a dilemma. 81 If
accused infringers chose to forego the right to assert a potentially powerful
advice of counsel defense, they would preserve their attorney-client and
work-product privileges. 82 However, if they opted to assert the advice of
counsel defense, accused infringers waived their attomey-client and work-
product privileges. 83 Under this rubric, accused infringers would not only
face increased risk of liability for willfully infringing the patent at issue, 84
but would also likely be subject to intrusive discovery and could expect
heavy litigation over the scope of the waiver. 85 Thus, accused infringers
would effectively be forced to waive their confidentiality privileges and
give the opposing party full access to normally undiscoverable materials. 86
Such an expansive waiver prompted parties to deliberately withhold
information from their attorneys out of fear that it would be discovered and
offered against them at trial. 87 This fear also had the potential to chill "full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients[,]" a liberty
that extends beyond patent law and is essential to the proper functioning of
the legal system. 88
Recognizing the problems that such an absolute waiver would create,
the Federal Circuit narrowed the scope of waiver in In re Echostar
Communications Corp.89  The Echostar court held that an "accused
infringer and his or her attorney do not give their opponent unfettered
discretion to rummage through all of their files and pillage all of their
litigation strategies" for asserting the advice of counsel defense to a willful
81. See Patent Baristas, Is the Tide of Willful Patent Infringement Litigation Receding?
(Aug. 24, 2007), http://patentbaristas.com/archives/2007/08/24/is-the-tide-of-wilful-patent-
infringement-litigation-receding.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., In re Echostar Commc 'ns, 448 F.3d at 1299.
84. Kun Wang, Note, Uncertainties in the Scope of Waiver in an Advice-of-Counsel Defense
and Ethical Issues for Attorneys Serving as Both Opinion and Trial Counsel, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 953, 962 (2007).
85. See Patent Baristas, supra note 81.
86. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (explaining items are discoverable only if the
party seeking discovery has a substantial need for the items in preparing its case and is unable to
obtain substantially equivalent evidence through other means); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383 (1981).
87. See Wang, supra note 84, at 961.
88. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389; see also Wang, supra note 84, at 961.
89. In re Echostar Commc 'ns, 448 F.3d 1294.
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infringement charge. 90 Although Echostar held that relying on in-house
counsel's advice to rebut a willfulness charge waives both the attorney-
client and work-product privileges, it limited the latter to work-product that
was actually communicated to an accused infringer. 91 However, Echostar
still did not address whether such a waiver extended to trial counsel. 92
Such was the evolution of the law before In re Seagate Tech., LLC. 
93
Knorr-Bremse and Echostar demonstrated the Federal Circuit's break from
earlier decisions that emphasized the rights of patent holders. The court's
focus on protecting the rights of accused willful infringers became even
more evident in Seagate.
III. THE SEAGATE DECISION
The In re Seagate Tech., LLC litigation began in July 2000, when
Convolve, Inc. and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (hereinafter
referred to as Convolve) sued Seagate alleging that it had willfully
infringed two of Convolve's patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 4,916,635 (the '635
patent) and 5,638,267 (the '267 patent). 94 On January 25, 2002, Convolve
amended its complaint to add U.S. Patent No. 6,314,473 (the '473 patent),
which was issued after Convolve's lawsuit against Seagate had begun. 95
Prior to the alleged infringement, Seagate consulted its counsel,
obtaining several opinions concerning Convolve's patents. 96  The first
opinion, issued July 24, 2000, addressed the '635 and '267 patents and
"concluded... that Seagate's products did not infringe." 97 Five months
later, Seagate's counsel supplied a second opinion, which "concluded that
the '267 patent was possibly unenforceable." 98  The opinions
acknowledged "that not all of the patent claims had been reviewed," and
that further analysis should be postponed until the '473 patent was issued. 99
Finally, Seagate's counsel issued a third opinion on February 21, 2003,
which focused on the '473 patent. 10o The Federal Circuit found that,
throughout this process, "Seagate's opinion counsel operated...
90. Id. at 1303.
91. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1368-70.
94. Id. at 1366.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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independently of trial counsel at all times." '0
In an effort to refute the willfulness charge, Seagate asserted the
advice of counsel defense, disclosed all three opinions, and allowed
Convolve to depose its opinion counsel. 102 Soon after, Convolve sought to
discover "any communications and work product" produced by Seagate's
attorneys, both its in-house and trial counsel. 103 Convolve sought a wide
range of documents, but seemed focused on obtaining the opinion counsel's
work-product. 104 The trial court favored Convolve and held that Seagate
had "waived the attorney-client privilege for all communications between it
and any counsel." J05
Furthermore, the trial court held that Seagate's waiver of the attorney-
client privilege and work-product protection began when Seagate "first
gained knowledge of the patents and would last until the alleged
infringement ceased." 106 Thus, Convolve could rightfully seek all
communications made during that period. 107 With respect to the trial
counsel's documents, the trial court provided for an in camera review and
held that "any advice from trial counsel that undermined the reasonableness
of relying on [opinion counsel's] opinions would warrant disclosure." '08
Additionally, the trial court held that "protection of work product
communicated to Seagate was waived." 109 Accordingly, Convolve sought
from Seagate all "trial counsel opinions relating to infringement, invalidity,
and enforceability of the patents, and also noticed depositions of Seagate's
trial counsel." 110
The trial court denied Seagate's subsequent request for an
interlocutory appeal and motion to stay. " Seagate then petitioned the
Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus. 112 In response, the Federal Circuit
stayed the discovery orders and, "sua sponte ordered en banc review of the
petition." 113 The en banc review set out to answer three questions. 114
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1366.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1366 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 1367.
107. See id.
108. Id.
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First, 115 "[g]iven the impact of the statutory duty of care standard
announced in [Underwater Devices] on the issue of waiver of attorney-
client privilege, should this court reconsider the decision in Underwater
Devices and the duty of care standard itself?" 116 Second, "[s]hould a
party's assertion of the advice of counsel defense to willful infringement
extend waiver of the attorney-client privilege to communications with that
party's trial counsel?" 117 Third, "[w]hat is the effect of any such waiver on
work-product immunity?" 118
In considering the first question, the Federal Circuit compared the
meaning of willfulness that was articulated in Underwater Devices with the
Supreme Court's recent interpretation in Safeco Insurance Company of
America v. Burr. 119 In Safeco Insurance, the Court discussed the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, which granted consumers actual damages for
negligent violations thereof and made punitive damages available for
willful violations. 120 The Court concluded that the "standard civil usage"
of willfulness includes reckless behavior. 121 The Court also held that using
the reckless definition for willfulness comported with the common law,
"which treated actions in 'reckless disregard' of the law as 'willful'
violations." 122
In Seagate, the Federal Circuit noted that the "duty of care [standard]
announced in Underwater Devices sets a lower threshold for willful
infringement that is more akin to negligence." 123 But, choosing instead to
follow the Court's reasoning in Safeco Insurance, the Federal Circuit
overruled that standard and held that willful infringement would require "at
least a showing of objective recklessness." 124 To clarify what it meant by
"recklessness," the court stated that a patentee could succeed in proving
willful infringement if there was "clear and convincing evidence that the
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted infringement of a valid patent." 125 The court emphasized that
an accused infringer's actual state of mind was not relevant to the threshold
115. The order of the questions presented by the Federal Circuit has been rearranged to
facilitate the organization of this Note.
116. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1367.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 1370-71.; see also Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007).
120. See Safeco Ins., 127 S. Ct. at 2205-06.
121. Id. at 2209.
122. Id. at 2208.
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objective inquiry. 126 Once a patentee meets the threshold objective
standard, the "patentee must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined
risk ... was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to
the accused infringer." 127
The court next considered the scope of the attorney-client privilege
waiver that results when an accused willful infringer asserts the advice of
counsel defense. 128 The Seagate court noted that, under Fort James Corp.
v. Solo Cup Co., a waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect to
one subject matter waived the privilege with respect to any
communications made by any of the party's attorneys that related to the
same subject matter. 129 However, district courts had reached varying
conclusions as to the extent that this broad waiver applied to trial
counsel. 130 While some lower courts extended the waiver to trial
counsel, 131 others took a balanced approach and "extended waiver to trial
counsel only for communications contradicting or casting doubt on the
opinions asserted." 132
Recognizing the need for a uniform approach, the Federal Circuit
noted that both fairness and the vastly different roles of trial counsel and
opinion counsel "advise against extending waiver to trial counsel." 133
Moreover, the court emphasized that "in ordinary circumstances,
willfulness will depend on an infringer's prelitigation conduct." 
134
Accordingly, it reasoned that communications with trial counsel are likely
to "have little, if any, relevance warranting their disclosure." 135 Thus, the
Seagate court held that asserting the advice of counsel defense "[does] not
constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege for communications with
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1372.
129. See Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("The
widely applied standard for determining the scope of a waiver of attorney-client privilege is that
the waiver applies to all other communications relating to the same subject matter.").
130. See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1372.
131. Id.; see, e.g., Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d
957 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that the scope of waiver resulting form the advice of counsel
defense automatically extends to all communications with trial counsel).
132. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1372; see, e.g., Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D. D.C. 2006) (holding that the scope of waiver resulting from the
advice of counsel defense extends to trial counsel only for communications contradicting or
casting doubt on opinion counsel's findings).
133. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1373.
134. Id. at 1374.
135. Id.
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trial counsel." 136 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that trial courts
may still exercise discretion in "unique circumstances to extend waiver to
trial counsel, such as if a party or counsel engages in chicanery." 137
Finally, the court determined that the advice of counsel defense
waiver may extend to trial counsel's work-product. 138 As before, the court
held that reliance on opinion counsel's work-product generally does not
waive trial counsel's work-product protection. 139 But, lower courts would
still have discretion to decide whether waiver should be extended to trial
counsel in situations where a "party or counsel engages in chicanery." 140
IV. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT AFTER SEAGATE
A. Seagate Correctly Limits Punitive Damages for
Intentional or Reckless Conduct
As discussed throughout this Note, Seagate has considerably changed
the willful patent infringement landscape. Seagate moved away from the
"affirmative duty of care" negligence standard established in Underwater
Devices and adopted a more rigorous "objective recklessness" standard. 141
The new two-part test requires a patent holder alleging willful infringement
to meet both an objective threshold and demonstrate the alleged infringer's
knowledge of the risk of infringement. 142 The great difficulty in meeting
this two-part test should not be underestimated. Without providing any
guidance or definition, the Federal Circuit's new test requires patent
holders to show that the infringer acted in the face of an "objectively high
likelihood" that its actions would infringe. 143 Even if the patent holders
satisfy this threshold inquiry, they must also prove that this objective risk
was "either known or so obvious that it should have been known" to the
infringer. 144
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1374-75 (failing to provide an appropriate definition of "chicanery").
138. Id. at 1375.
139. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1376.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1371.
142. See id. (noting that patentee must show "infringer acted despite an objectively high
likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent." Once this standard is met,
the patentee must then demonstrate that "this objectively-defined risk... was either known or so
obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.").
143. Id.; see also Sharper Image Corp. v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., 222 F.R.D. 621, 630 (N.D.
Cal. 2004).
144. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371; see also Sharper Image, 222 F.R.D. at 630.
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In effect, the Seagate holding significantly shifts the risks and
burdens originally faced by accused willful infringers under the
Underwater Devices standard back to patent holders seeking treble
damages. 145 The need to curb the growing number of frivolous willful
infringement cases was the court's likely motivation. 146 The Seagate
ruling, however, also addressed other inequities associated with the
Underwater Devices duty of care standard. 147
Courts have generally rejected the argument that treble damages
should function as a remedial measure for injured patent holders. 148 in
Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., the Federal Circuit acknowledged that
although 35 U.S.C. § 284 was silent on when enhanced damages may be
granted, case law had established that "enhanced damages are punitive, not
compensatory." 149 Since an accused infringer only needs to be negligent in
order to meet the Underwater Devices standard, 150 it made little sense to
award a patent owner enhanced damages for such non-egregious conduct.
A rule that requires reprehensible conduct before awarding punitive
damages was advocated prior to the Seagate decision. 151 Such a rule is
justified not only on grounds of fairness to alleged willful infringers, but
also by the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence. 152 Based on
145. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371; see also Sharper Image, 222 F.R.D. at 630.
146. See Grant Gross, Patent Reform Debate Heats Up, IDG NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 28, 2007,
http://www.pcworld.com/printable/article/id,139005/printable.html (citing a finding by the
Coalition for Patent Reform asserting that the number of patent lawsuits filed each year has
almost tripled); see also In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
147. See Thomas Claburn, Google Calls for Patent Reform, INFORMATIONWEEK, Sept. 5,
2007, http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=201804286 ("Google
and other technology companies increasingly face mounting legal costs to defend against
frivolous patent claims."); see also Jessie Seyfer, Patent Defendants Score Big at Federal Circuit,
RECORDER, Aug. 21, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l187600834319 (quoting
Edward Reins, president of the Federal Circuit Bar Association, who stated that "'[i]n Seagate,
the [court]... attempt[s] to address some of the excesses of patent litigation').
148. See Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
149. Id. at 1574 (citing Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing and Lithographing Co.,
923 F.2d 1576, 1580 (1991)).
150. See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 ("[T]he duty of care [standard] announced in
Underwater Devices sets a lower threshold for willful infringement that is more akin to
negligence."); Sharper Image Corp. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 621, 630 (N.D. Cal.
2004) ("[Slome judicial articulations of the kind of showing that could satisfy the objective
standard seem to move the infringement inquiry into perilous proximity to mere negligence.").
151. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A] finding of
reprehensibility is a predicate to the award of punitive damages.").
152. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) ("It should
be presumed a plaintiff has been made whole for his injuries by compensatory damages, so
punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant's culpability, after having paid
compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to
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this reasoning, Seagate's objective recklessness test is not only consistent
with prior punitive damages jurisprudence, but it also comports with
general notions of fairness to those accused of willfully infringing. 153
B. Seagate Eliminates the Problems Associated with Notice Under the
Underwater Devices Duty of Care Standard
Another imbalance resulting from the Underwater Devices
affirmative duty of care standard resulted from courts' interpretation of
"actual notice." 154  According to Underwater Devices, a patent holder
would likely be able to recover enhanced damages if the patentee could
prove that the accused willful infringer was on actual notice of the patent at
issue. 155 In Imonex Services v. W.H. Munzprufer Deitmar Trenner GmbH,
Imonex alleged that Munzprufer willfully infringed its patent rights
because Munzprufer had actual notice of its patents. 156 According to the
facts, Imonex disclosed its patents to the employees of the infringers at
trade shows years before filing suit. 157 Additionally, Imonex distributed
advertising literature indicating that its products were patented, and it even
informed Munzprufer's employees about the use of its patented devices in
their products. 158
Although the defendants agreed that Imonex informed its employees
of the patents, they argued that "notice was insufficient to trigger its duty of
due care, because no defendant employees with decision-making capacity
received notice or studied the patents themselves." 159 The Imonex court
rejected this argument and held that there was substantial evidence for the
jury to find willfulness. 160 In effect, the Imonex court punished the accused
organizations for "willfully" infringing simply because their employees
were put on notice. 161 Unreasonably, the court gave "little consideration of
the blameworthiness of the conduct of the individuals deciding to make [or]
market" the infringing product. 162 The Imonex decision illustrates the
achieve punishment or deterrence.").
153. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371; see also Sharper Image, 222 F.R.D. at 630.
154. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371; see also Sharper Image, 222 F.R.D. at 630.
155. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371; see also Sharper Image, 222 F.R.D. at 630.
156. See Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Deitmar Trenner GmbH, 408 F.3d 1375,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005).





162. Brief for Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York as Amici Curiae In Support of
Neither Party at 10, In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No. 00-CV-5141).
2008]
256 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENTLAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:239
undue burden organizations face when accused of willful infringement
under the Underwater Devices standard. In abandoning the duty of care
standard, Seagate helps to avoid problems associated with unusually broad
interpretations of notice. The Federal Circuit explicitly held that the "state
of mind of the accused infringer [was] not relevant to [the] objective
inquiry." 
163
C. Seagate Eliminates the Financial Burdens Associated with the Advice of
Counsel Requirement
The Seagate decision also alleviates the problem of the role the
advice of counsel defense plays in a willfulness charge. In many cases, the
most determinative factor in the willfulness equation is whether the
defendant sought advice of counsel upon learning about the patent at
issue. 164 If the counsel's opinion was that the patent at issue was invalid,
not infringed, or unenforceable, then the accused willful infringer could
successfully assert that it relied on the advice of counsel, helping to
establish that any resulting infringement was not willful. 165 Although an
invaluable defense, this advice of counsel requirement was an additional
burden that the accused willful infringer would have to meet before the
willful infringement inquiry even began. 166 The severe financial burden
this requirement places on organizations should not be underestimated. 167
The court's prior willfulness inquiry focuses on the accused infringer's
conduct on a continuous basis. 168 As a result, it may be necessary for the
accused infringer to "update the opinion over time and especially during
163. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
164. See Sharper Image, 222 F.R.D. at 631 ("[I]n the willfulness equation the weightiest
single factor often will be whether, upon learning about the patents in question, the defendant
sought advice of counsel and received a 'competent' opinion either that his product did not
infringe or that the patent would be deemed invalid or for some other reason unenforceable."); see
also Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("It is well
settled that an important factor in determining whether willful infringement has been shown is
whether or not the infringer obtained the opinion of counsel.").
165. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
166. See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368-69.
167. See Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amici Curiae In Support of
Petitioner at 12, In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No. 00-CV-
5141) ("A typical opinion can cost $20,000, but complicated ones may cost more than
$ 100,000-money that biotechnology businesses would much rather invest in their products than
in their lawyers."); see also Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's
Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1092 (2003) ("[Counsel] opinions are
expensive. Estimates we have heard put the cost at between $20,000 and S100,000 per patent, and
notices of infringement often include more than one patent.").
168. Sharper Image, 222 F.R.D. at 644-45.
THE WILLFULNESS PENDULUM SWINGS BACK
litigation to account for new information." 169 The process of updating
patent opinions can lead to a significant financial burden. 170
In Seagate, the Federal Circuit explicitly held that "[b]ecause we
abandon the affirmative duty of due care, we also reemphasize that there is
no affirmative obligation to obtain the opinion of counsel." 171 Thus,
Seagate "focuses less on whether the accused infringer obtained [an]
opinion.., and more on whether the defendant did what a 'hypothetical
reasonable company should have done under the circumstances."' 172 In
effect, Seagate's objective recklessness test no longer requires companies
to go out and obtain costly opinions every time willful infringement is
alleged. 173
Although it is arguable whether companies are unlikely to stop
seeking advice of counsel as a defense, 174 Seagate helps alleviate some
financial burden on organizations by providing alleged willful infringers
the option to not seek such advice. 175 The role of the advice of counsel
defense under Seagate remains unclear. So far, at least one court has held
that evidence of reliance upon opinion letters stating that the patents-in-suit
were invalid and not infringed would not conclusively prove objective
reasonableness. 176
169. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 167, at 1093-94.
170. Id. at 1094.
171. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
172. Seyfer, supra note 147.
173. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
174. Thomas Elkind, Seagate ruling raises the bar for infringement liability, BOSTON
BUSINESS JOURNAL, Sept. 21, 2007,
http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2007/O9/24/focus4.html ("Even though the court has
stated that there is no obligation to obtain an opinion of counsel, it seems clear that if an opinion
is obtained that concludes that the patent is invalid, unenforceable or not infringed, it will be very
difficult for the patent holder to prove that the infringer knew or should have known that there
was an objectively high likelihood that its actions infringed a valid patent.").
175. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 ("Because we abandon the affirmative duty of due
care, we also reemphasize that there is no affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of counsel.").
176. See TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 561, 578 (E.D. Tex. 2007) ("AT&T
provided uncontradicted evidence that Mr. Samuel Dworetsky, an employee of AT&T, received,
and relied upon, opinion letters from the law firm Morgan & Finnegan stating that the patents-in-
suit were invalid and not infringed by the AT&T System. The correspondence between AT&T's
other counsel Akin Gump, and TGIP's predecessor, Call Processing Inc. ('CPI'), sets out
AT&T's position that the patents-in-suit are invalid, referring to invalidity based upon the
Yamaki publication and to noninfringement because of prior activation of the cards .... If
AT&T had the burden of proof, this evidence would not conclusively prove that AT&T was
objectively reasonable.").
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D. In Comparison to Underwater Devices, Seagate No Longer
Incentivizes Parties to Be Willfully Blind
A key issue that Seagate indirectly addresses concerns the willful
blindness strategy adopted by many organizations. "' Under the old
willfulness standard, a party could be liable for willful infringement if it
had acquired knowledge of the patent at issue at any point in time. 178
Indeed, this broad interpretation of "knowledge" by lower courts perversely
incentivized companies to be willfully blind of existing patents. 179 In a
series of hearings conducted by the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice involving the "balance of competition and patent law
and policy," Iso business participants in the hearings readily admitted that
"they do not read their competitors' patents out of concern for such
potential treble damage liability." 181
Under prior jurisprudence, if a company learned of a competitor's
patent, it was forced to spend tens of thousands of dollars to obtain an
exculpatory patent opinion, no matter how they learned of the patent at
issue. 182 Companies soon realized that they would be much better off if
they had never learned of their competitor's patent. 183 As a result, many
patent lawyers began advising their clients to avoid reading all patents to
avoid liability for willfulness. 184 The practice of willful blindness was
promulgated throughout the company, from decision-makers all the way to
product engineers. 185
Although such company-wide prohibitions from reading or discussing
other patents provided organizations some protection against a charge for
willful infringement, such measures also took a serious toll on some of the
fundamental justifications for the patent system. Indeed, one clear
disadvantage of the "ignorance is bliss" strategy was the way it stifled open
177. See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
178. See Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Deitmar Trenner GmbH, 408 F.3d 1375,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
179. See, e.g., id.
180. FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 3 ("The FTC/DOJ Hearings Examined the Balance of
Competition and Patent Law and Policy.").
181. Id. at 16.
182. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 167, at 1100.
183. Id. at 1100-01.
184. Id. ("Once a company becomes aware of a patent, it has an obligation to obtain a
written opinion of counsel or risk later being held a willful infringer. To avoid this significant
cost, in-house patent counsel and many outside lawyers regularly advise their clients not to read
patents if there is any way to avoid it. What you do know will certainly harm you, they reason, so
it is generally better not to know.").
185. See id.
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discussion, 186 a result that harms both individuals and society in general.
Ironically, the same patent system that sought to promote open disclosure
of ideas by granting inventors the right to exclusivity also incentivized
others to be willfully blind of such disclosures. This odd result was a
product of the Federal Circuit's Underwater Devices jurisprudence.
Although the Seagate decision is not guaranteed to prevent companies
from practicing willful blindness, the structure of the two-part objective
recklessness test does not incentivize this practice to the same extent as the
Underwater Devices standard. As the Federal Circuit held, the first part of
the objective recklessness test requires the patentee to present "evidence
that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent." 187 Furthermore, the
court held that "[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer [was] not
relevant to [the] objective inquiry." 188
Indeed, as Judge Gajarsa pointed out in his Seagate concurrence, any
subjective beliefs of the accused willful infringer would only be relevant if
the patent holder successfully showed that the accused acted objectively
unreasonable. 189 So far, at least one court has affirmed that an accused
infringer's knowledge of the patent at issue does not establish willful
infringement. 190 Accordingly, under Seagate, organizations are less likely
to go to such extreme measures to avoid obtaining knowledge.
V. APPLICATION OF THE SEAGATE TEST BY COURTS SHOWS THAT IT WILL
POSITIVELY IMPACT THE PATENT SYSTEM
Although the Federal Circuit formulated a two-step "objective
recklessness" framework for analyzing willful infringement, 191 it never
explained how courts should go about applying that standard. Instead, the
Federal Circuit expressly reserved the application of its willfulness
standard to be developed by future cases. 192 Furthermore, Judge
Newman's concurrence suggested that any future application of its
186. Alex Wexelblat, Copyfight, The Sad State of Patents Effects (Aug. 13, 2007),
http://copyfight.cormate.com/archives/2007/08/13/the-sad-state-of patent-effects.php.
187. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1384 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) ("Seagate's subjective beliefs may become
relevant only if Convolve successfully makes this showing of objective unreasonableness.").
190. See Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 526 F. Supp. 2d. 84, 103 (D. Mass. 2007)
("Willful infringement is not established by the simple fact of infringement, even where the
accused has knowledge of the patents.").
191. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
192. Id. ("We leave it to future cases to further develop the application of this standard.").
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willfulness standard would comport with "standards of fair commerce." 193
Although only a handful of willful infringement opinions have applied the
Seagate willful infringement test, 194 the results in these cases suggest that
Seagate will have an overall positive impact on the patent system.
In Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp., Cohesive alleged that
Waters had willfully infringed on one of its patents. '95 The court noted
that a Waters employee discovered Cohesive's patent one week after it was
filed, and subsequently forwarded it to Waters' in-house counsel. 196 Waters
had been manufacturing a product similar to the one described in
Cohesive's patent application. 197 However, after learning about
Cohesive's patent, Waters began conducting extensive experiments in order
to determine whether Cohesive's patents would preclude Waters from
selling its product. 198 After conducting the experiments, Waters'
managers, scientists, and in-house counsel held a meeting to review the
Cohesive patent application and determine whether Waters' product had
infringed upon it. 199 Based on their findings at the meeting, Waters' in-
house counsel drafted an opinion concluding that Waters had not infringed
Cohesive's patent. 200
Applying Seagate, the Cohesive court considered several factors that
were relevant to the objective recklessness inquiry. 201 The Cohesive
factors included:
(1) whether there was a bona fide disagreement regarding patent
invalidity or infringement, (2) whether the infringer solicited or
followed the advice of counsel, (3) whether there was continued
infringement after notice of probable infringement was received,
(4) whether there was a degree of similarity between the
patented and accused devices, (5) whether the infringer took
efforts to avoid infringement, and (6) whether the infringer was
indemnified against infringement costs. 202
193. Id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring) ("The standards of behavior by which a possible
infringer evaluates adverse patents should be the standards of fair commerce, including
reasonableness of the actions taken in the particular circumstances.").
194. See, e.g., Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 526 F. Supp. 2d 84, 103 (D. Mass.
2007).





200. Cohesive Tech., 526 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
201. Id. at 103-04.
202. Id.
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Based on the facts, the court concluded that the evidence of willful
infringement was not clear and convincing. 203 The evidence showed that
Waters did not copy its product from Cohesive. 204 Moreover, Waters
practiced "sufficient due diligence in determining whether its product
would infringe," which the court held was indicative of the company acting
in good faith . 205 Further, the court noted that Waters conducted
experiments, held a meeting to determine potential infringement, and
concluded that there was a bona fide dispute over whether it had infringed,
all before the company sold any of its products. 206 Accordingly, the court
held that Cohesive did not prove that Waters willfully infringed. 207
If this same case were decided under the Underwater Devices
standard, it is likely that the court would have reached the same result.
Assuming the same facts, it is likely that Waters would have responded to
Cohesive's willfulness charge by asserting the advice of counsel defense to
show that it acted in good faith. 208 Although it is likely that the
Underwater Devices and Seagate willfulness standards would lead to the
same result in this case, it is important to consider how those standards
would independently reach the result. In an Underwater Devices analysis,
the court's main inquiry would focus on whether the accused met its duty
of care by seeking advice from counsel. 209 Assuming the court was
satisfied that reliance on the counsel's opinion was in good faith, it would
rule that the infringement was not willful. 210
The court's analysis in Seagate, however, focused the inquiry on the
"reasonableness of the actions taken in the particular circumstances." 2 ' In
arriving at its decision, the Cohesive court noted all the things Waters did
correctly: performing extensive research, meeting to discuss any possible
infringement, and seeking the advice of counsel.212 Unlike the old
willfulness test, which merely incentivized parties to obtain advice of
counsel, this court's application rewarded the accused willful infringer for
exercising due diligence upon learning of any possible infringement. 213
203. Id. at 105.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Cohesive Techs., 526 F. Supp. 2d at 105.
207. Id. at 106-07.
208. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
209. Id. at 1390.
210. See id.
211. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring).
212. Cohesive Techs., 526 F. Supp. 2d at 104-05.
213. Id. at 105.
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Indeed, this is the kind of proactive conduct that courts should be
incentivizing in order to encourage accused willful infringers to act
accordingly.
Two additional benefits of Seagate were demonstrated in TGIP, Inc.
v. AT&T Corp. 214 In this case, TGIP sought damages from AT&T for
willful infringement. 215 Applying Seagate, the court held that "TGIP had
the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that AT&T knew, or
should have known, that there was an objectively high likelihood that
AT&T was infringing on one or both of [TGIP's] patents."216 In support of
its burden, TGIP produced letters sent to AT&T accusing the corporation
of infringement and the fact that a jury found AT&T had infringed in
2007.217 The court held that this evidence was "only a scintilla of the
evidence needed" under the Seagate standard. 218
AT&T separately provided evidence that one of its employees
obtained opinion letters soon after learning of the possible infringement. 219
The opinion letters stated that the patents at issue were invalid and not
infringed by AT&T. 220 Addressing this evidence, the court noted that
AT&T did not have the burden of proving it was objectively reasonable. 221
Even if it did have the burden, the opinion letters did not prove that AT&T
was objectively reasonable.222 In continuing with its application of
Seagate, the court noted that "[e]ven though AT&T ultimately did not
prove its invalidity defense by clear and convincing evidence, its position
was hardly objectively unreasonable."2 23
The TGIP court's reasoning provides greater insight into the
application of the Seagate test. Although TGIP had sent letters accusing
AT&T of infringement, the court held that such notice was "hardly
objectively unreasonable. 224  Under a strict application of Seagate, it
appears that AT&T knew or should have known that it was infringing on
TGIP's patents. 225 However, the TGIP court emphasized that there was no
214. TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
215. Id. at 568.
216. Id. at 579.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 578.
220. TGIP, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 578.




225. See id. ("TGIP's evidence in this regard consists of the 1998 and 1999 letters accusing
AT&T of infringement ....").
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clear and convincing evidence that "it was known or obvious that there was
an objectively high likelihood that AT&T's non-infringement position was
incorrect." 226
The TGIP case highlights two things. First, an accused infringer need
not be liable for willful infringement simply because they were put on
notice, so long as there was a bona fide dispute of fact as to the validity of
the patent at issue. 227 Second, Seagate no longer requires the accused
infringer to rebut a charge of willfulness. 228 Previously, the Underwater
Devices standard permitted patentees to charge the accused infringer with
willfulness, and the burden to refute the charge was on the accused. 229
After Seagate, the burden to prove willfulness now rests with the
patentee. 230 The realignment of this burden is proof that Seagate is
consistent with general notions of fairness and justice. Therefore, Seagate
may curb lawsuits alleging frivolous claims of willfulness.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's new standard significantly tilts the balance in
favor of the accused willful infringer. The court's move to the reckless
standard is more than just an attempt to harmonize the definition of
"willfulness" with Supreme Court precedent. 231 Seagate is a policy-based
decision that limits recovery of punitive damages to instances involving
truly reprehensible conduct. 232 While discouraging willful infringement
226. TGIP, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 579.
227. See id. ("Reasonable persons, properly instructed and exercising impartial judgment,
could not find by clear and convincing evidence that AT&T acted in the face of an unjustifiably
high risk of harm that was either known, or so obvious that it should have been known.").
228. Id. ("If AT&T had the burden of proof, this evidence [(opinion letters from AT&T's
legal counsel stating patent-in-suit were invalid)] would not conclusively prove that AT&T was
objectively reasonable. However, TGIP had the burden to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that AT&T knew, or should have known, that there was an objectively high likelihood
that AT&T was infringing on one or both of the patents.").
229. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("Where, as here, a potential infringer has actual notice of another's patent rights, he has an
affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing. Such an
affirmative duty includes, inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from
counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing activity." (citations omitted)).
230. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[T]o establish
willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid
patent.").
231. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2007) ("[W]here
willfulness is a statutory condition of civil liability, we have generally taken it to cover not only
knowing violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well").
232. See In re Seagate 497 F.3d at 1371.
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activity is an important goal of the patent system, the Underwater Devices
standard was unduly burdensome on accused willful infringers. Due to this
broad standard, accusing a party of willful infringement became a routine
charge in patent proceedings. 233 The Seagate decision should limit such
abuse.
It is a natural law that for every action there is an equal and opposite
reaction. Thus, while Seagate greatly benefits those accused of willful
infringement, it also impinges on the rights of patentees. Under Seagate,
patent owners have to meet a much greater burden in order to recover
damages for willful infringement. However, because the Seagate test is
still in its infancy, it is not clear to what extent patentees will face such a
burden. Although the Seagate standard does not necessarily make it
impossible for patentees to recover enhanced damages, it is up to the courts
to define the boundaries of Seagate. In the interim, one thing is clear-the
Seagate decision corrects many of the problems troubling the patent
system. For that reason alone, it is a step in the right direction.
Siraj Husain
233. See Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED.
CIR. B.J. 227, 232 (2005) ("For those that complained that willful infringement was alleged in
every lawsuit, their concerns were justified."); Brief for Amicus Curiae American Intellectual
Property Law Association as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioner at 1, In re Seagate
Technology LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No. 2006-830) ("Although findings of willful
infringement are quite rare, willful infringement is pled as a boilerplate charge in almost every
patent case.").
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